

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 June 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. D. POPOV

Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. C. J. MARSHALL

Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K. P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I. I. CHEPROV
Mr. M. P. SHELEPIN
Mr. V. B. TULINOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. J. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. G. BREAN
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I declare open the two hundred and sixty-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): As I am speaking for the first time during this session, I should like to extend to our Brazilian colleague, Ambassador da Silveira, the warm welcome of the Indian Delegation and to assure him of our continued collaboration.

The Committee is now entering a significant phase in its deliberations. It will need to pursue its negotiations with renewed vigour during the next few weeks so that it may register some positive progress in the tasks entrusted to it. Such progress should enable the Committee to submit an appropriate report to the General Assembly of the United Nations providing firm and adequate grounds to that Organization to reaffirm its faith and its hope in the ideal of general and complete disarmament and to direct the Committee to continue its quest for just and equitable solutions to the problems of arms control and limitation as well as of general and complete disarmament.

Some of us who have spoken recently have emphasized, and emphasized quite rightly, that tangible solutions to specific problems have so far eluded us. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the issues which we debate and negotiate in this Committee are highly complex issues affecting the vital security interests of the entire international community and that the objective we seek, namely a world without arms, is unprecedented in the history of mankind. These negotiations, therefore, require to be conducted with care, precision and patience.

Although, as I said earlier, we have not yet produced tangible solutions to specific problems, we have in fact made some progress on the level of negotiations. Thus, for example, on the question of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, if we compare many of the statements being made in the Committee these days with those being made a few months ago, we shall find unmistakably that we have defined the issues dividing the different approaches fairly distinctly and that we know which are the few specific points which need to be settled in order to reach an agreement acceptable to all concerned. That does not mean, of course, that we can now congratulate ourselves. The fact that we have done a little does not mean that we should not or even could not have done more. It only means that we should now work with greater determination and renewed vigour so that we may be able to achieve concrete results during the coming weeks.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

The General Assembly of the United Nations laid down three specific priorities for us (ENDC/161). It asked us to make substantial progress in reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control (A/RES/2031(XX)). The Indian delegation laid particular stress on this matter in its statement of 3 May (ENDC/PV.261), towards the end of the last session, and it hopes that the Committee will continue to discuss the points on which disagreements have developed in the past. It is necessary that the report of the Committee devote adequate space to this theme so that the Members of the United Nations may be in a position to gauge the extent to which we have defined the issues on this highly complex and vital problem.

The second item which the General Assembly stressed as a priority item was the question of negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons (A/RES/2028(XX)). The Committee has so far devoted most of its statements to this item and, as I said earlier, although we have not reached an agreement, the issues in dispute have now been clearly defined. For its part, the Indian delegation spoke once again on the subject on the last day of the last session (ENDC/PV.263).

The third problem to which the General Assembly asked the Committee to direct its attention was that of nuclear weapon tests. In fact, it asked the Committee, inter alia, to continue with a sense of urgency its work on arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments and to report to the General Assembly (A/RES/2032(XX)).

The Committee has so far allotted only a few meetings to discussion of this subject, but it appears to the Indian delegation that from now on we need to devote much more time to it, not only because the General Assembly has asked us to deal with it with a sense of urgency but also because this is one field in which there is greater hope of success between now and September. We have probed various other avenues and have encountered some serious hurdles. In view of that, it is desirable that we take a closer look at the problem of the nuclear weapon test ban, which seems to offer greater hope of tangible progress in the foreseeable future.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

India has always believed that the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is the first step on the path of nuclear sanity. It was the first country to appeal to the international community that an end be put to all nuclear weapon tests. That was over twelve years ago, and, although the Indian appeals were unsuccessful in the early years, the United Nations finally adopted the historic resolution 1762(XVII) which condemned all nuclear weapon tests. The last session of the General Assembly recalled that resolution in its resolution 2032(XX) and noted with regret that nuclear weapon tests had taken place notwithstanding that condemnatory resolution and subsequent resolutions.

On the question of nuclear weapon tests, therefore, the concern of the world community has been constant and consistent, and humanity demands that all nuclear weapon tests in all environments be stopped immediately. There have been nearly 400 atmospheric tests already, and they have not yet ceased. Underground tests are also continuing. It is therefore necessary, as resolution 2032(XX) has enjoined us to do, that we in the Committee continue our work "on arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments ..." (ibid).

In the history of the struggle against nuclear weapon tests there have been three hopeful and constructive features. First, there has been the universal demand of all humanity for the cessation of the tests. That demand is as insistent as ever. Secondly, scientific opinion has demonstrated convincingly the hazards of the contamination of the environment and the radiation exposure of human beings from nuclear explosions, and fresh explosions produce fresh demonstrations of such hazards. Thirdly, there was the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) of August 1963 banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. India welcomed that Treaty and was in fact the first country to sign it in Moscow after it had been signed by the three original parties.

Unfortunately, however, that partial Treaty has been unable to fulfil its promise. It has remained doubly partial: first because it has been adhered to only partially and not by all countries, with one non-signatory indulging in repeated atmospheric explosions of increasing kilotonnage and the other non-signatory announcing its intention to undertake its first post-treaty explosion, and **secondly** because the

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

Treaty still remains partial in its prohibited environments and does not cover underground nuclear weapon tests. The present unstable situation threatens our past achievements and poses great danger for the future. The partial satisfaction which the international community experienced in 1963 is thus fast fading, and it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the instrument of hope that we then fashioned is given additional strength and effectiveness.

When we talk of nuclear weapon tests, therefore, it is essential that we talk comprehensively of all nuclear weapon tests, that we talk of tests in all environments, and that we remember the terms of United Nations resolution 2032(XX) of the last session, namely "arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments".

In working out those arrangements, the first priority should logically and coherently be given to the task of making the Moscow test-ban Treaty universally applicable. Not much thought has yet been given to that problem, as admittedly it is a difficult problem. But then all disarmament problems are difficult, some more than others. Our Committee would, however, cease to function if we avoided a problem because it was difficult. The Pugwash scientists, who met in Karlovy Vary in September 1964, did give some thought to it and suggested in a communiqué that "ways and means be found to convince the governments and the peoples concerned of the inadvisability of any further atmospheric testing". Those ways and means have to be found, for it is imperative to preserve the spirit and the provisions of the Moscow test-ban Treaty. The General Assembly has asked the Committee in particular to report on those arrangements at the next session, and it is incumbent upon us to make positive suggestions to the Assembly on the matter. As the Indian delegation observed on 24 November 1965 in the debate on this item in the First Committee of the General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1384, p.13-15), the international community has requested and has urged, it has deplored and it has condemned; but neither its displeasure nor its appeals have borne any fruit. It cannot, therefore, remain helpless and impotent much longer and it should examine the steps which could be taken to ensure that the partial test-ban Treaty of August 1963 is universally binding. That is the only way to remove a part of its partiality and make it real and abiding.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

The second aspect of the problem is that of underground nuclear tests; and the twentieth session of the General Assembly has directed the Committee to devote its attention to that aspect as well. In consonance with its past pronouncements, the United Nations was categorical on one issue, and in the first operative paragraph of resolution 2032 (XX) urged that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended. Irrespective, therefore, of differences on methods of identification and verification of suspicious events, the General Assembly has urged the great Powers to suspend underground nuclear weapon tests. It was the third operative paragraph which was directed at our Committee and talked of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as distinct from a suspension of tests.

On the question of all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, India has consistently advocated a two-pronged approach, dealing both with the suspension of actual explosions and with an international treaty embodying a formal and legal obligation prohibiting them. As far as the first aspect of the problem is concerned, India has continued to urge that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended pending finalization of formal instruments. As early as April 1954 India forwarded to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee a statement made by the then Prime Minister of India in our Parliament, proposing that such experiments should cease and that at least a standstill arrangement be arrived at in respect of the actual explosions pending further negotiations on more substantial agreements.

On the second part of the problem, agreement on an international treaty, India has attempted to advance several specific ideas individually as well as collectively. In this context the Indian delegation would like to quote some relevant passages from the memorandum submitted by it to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in September 1964, which forms part of the Committee's report of 15 September 1964 to the General Assembly (ENDC/148):

"(b) we regret that the negotiations, if any, between the nuclear powers for the banning of all tests have not yet led to any results. We realize that there are differences among the nuclear powers on the question of identification and verification of underground tests. We consider it imperative, however, that all underground tests should be discontinued immediately, either by unilateral decisions based on the policy of mutual example, or in some other appropriate way, while negotiations are going on for reconciling the differences between the nuclear powers.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

"(c) The nuclear powers might also take steps towards the conclusion of a formal treaty on the cessation of underground tests by stages. Thus, another partial treaty might be entered into for cessation of tests above a limited threshold. For establishing such a threshold, it might be necessary for the nuclear powers to exchange scientific and other data. The threshold could be lowered subsequently as a result of the continuing exchange of scientific and other data and other negotiations." (ENDC/144, p.11).

The Indian delegation would emphasize at this stage that that is also the approach adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its last session. Resolution 2032 (XX) urged in its operative paragraph 1 "that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended", and separately in operative paragraph 3 asked our Committee "to continue ... its work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, taking into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection."

I said earlier that a nuclear test ban offered some prospect of progress during this session. In expressing that view the Indian delegation had in mind in particular three important developments which took place recently. First, there were the two statements made during the last session by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, putting forward most cogently and convincingly the argument for the early concluding of a treaty banning underground tests based on a formula of verification by challenge (ENDC/PV.247, 256). Secondly, the representative of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador Khallaf, gave us a comprehensive outline of an acceptable partial solution coupled with a total moratorium on all tests and incorporating the Swedish formula of verification by challenge (ENDC/PV.259). Finally, on the initiative of the Government of Sweden, representatives of some non-nuclear countries, including India, met in Stockholm last month and discussed the possibility of developing a system of exchanging seismological data through international co-operation which might be useful in connexion with a comprehensive test ban. All those constructive developments and propositions are in consonance with the views of the United Nations. They reflect the deeply-felt desires of the peoples of the world, and the Indian delegation welcomes them.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

The Indian delegation believes that it is possible to reach an agreement on the lines suggested by Ambassador Khallaf. In other words, there should be in the first instance a suspension of all tests. Secondly, the super-Powers should agree to a formal treaty prohibiting underground tests above an agreed threshold -- say, that of a seismic magnitude of 4.75 or 4.8. Associated with the suspension of all weapon tests and the prohibited threshold, the treaty would include a withdrawal clause of the kind suggested by Mrs. Myrdal in our Committee on 14 April (ENDC/PV.256), so as to provide for verification by challenge. Thirdly, the constructive trend set in motion at the Stockholm Conference should be strengthened and supported so that the idea put forward in the United Nations resolution could find its full scientific application. Fourthly, the scientific developments in the field of identification should be pursued vigorously so that the agreed threshold could be lowered and eventually eliminated, converting the de facto suspension into a de jure prohibition as early as possible.

The Indian delegation believes that it is possible to reach agreement on that basis and in any case to make some positive progress in that direction between now and the end of the current session of our Committee. The matter is undoubtedly urgent. We trust that we shall be able to report to the General Assembly that, at least on that issue, we have implemented its resolution faithfully and scrupulously.

The question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests has been in the forefront of public concern from the early days of the bomb. Its imperative necessity has not lessened with the passage of time but has in fact been increasing with every additional explosion in the atmosphere and underground. Recently many of us have been talking of the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but the menace of the continuing testing of nuclear weapons is, if anything, even more real and more awesome. Many of us have been talking of the advantages of a treaty on preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons; but the benefits of the discontinuance of atomic weapon tests are wider and more far-reaching. As United Nations resolution 2032 (XX) pointed out, a comprehensive test ban is in itself a positive non-proliferation measure; and recently the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, in its resolution 17 (III)

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adopted on 4 May, noted that tests of nuclear weapons constituted a form of proliferation of such weapons and expressed its conviction that it was necessary to put an end to their proliferation (A/6328, Annex 2, p.4).

Whether, therefore, one views the problem from the limited aspect of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, or from the aspect of the health of humanity and limiting the level of environmental radioactivity, or from the aspect of the very real danger of an immensely extended arms race which seems to be threatening us, it is essential that we devote our primary attention to the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and of working out arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

It has been said that time is running out in regard to proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is even more true in the case of nuclear weapon tests. Continued atmospheric explosions place the partial test-ban Treaty in increasing jeopardy, apart from contaminating the earth's atmosphere and the international political climate. Continued underground explosions are intended only to serve the interest of an intensified arms race and are bound to lead to giant missiles and improved-capability missiles and a host of new generations of offensive missiles, creating a vicious circle of defensive-offensive systems. When that takes place, scant attention will be paid to propositions that we put forward in this Committee for a freeze of production of fissile material for weapon purposes or for a suspension of nuclear weapon tests. It is essential, therefore, that we act before it is too late.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Today I should like to dwell once again on the question of prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

However, before I go into this matter, the serious events which took place yesterday in the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and which have darkened the atmosphere both in this Committee and throughout the world, oblige me to say a few words on that subject. The Government of the United States yesterday took a further serious step towards broadening the scope of its aggression in Viet-Nam. United States aircraft, intensifying their brigandish raids against the territory of a sovereign State, namely the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, carried out a barbarous bombing of the capital of that country, Hanoi, and of its most important port, Haiphong. Thus United States imperialism has added a new link to the very long chain of crimes committed by it in a vain attempt to crush the heroic struggle for freedom of the Viet-Nameese people.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

These latest events in Viet-Nam confirm once again that United States imperialism, in pursuit of its reckless policy, does not even shrink from steps which may have most serious consequences for developments throughout the world. They once again throw light on the policy of deceiving world public opinion by talk about the alleged readiness of the United States to accept a peaceful settlement of the situation in Viet-Nam. What sort of peaceful settlement can be spoken about by those who are shamelessly trampling underfoot all standards of international law, all standards governing relations between civilized States? Moreover, those who are perpetrating this flagrant, naked aggression against the heroic people of Viet-Nam have also the audacity to speak of defence against some sort of "aggression".

The United States aggression rightly provokes growing indignation and anger throughout the world. It is significant that even the closest allies of the United States have dissociated themselves from the latest acts of aggression by the United States against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Moreover, in the United States itself, the number of realistically-thinking politicians who condemn the dangerous course taken by the Government of the United States is constantly growing.

The fact that United States imperialism in Viet-Nam is compelled to resort to ever more brutal and cruel forms of aggression bears witness to yet another fact. Even with the help of the cruellest methods the United States aggressors are in no position to crush the heroic struggle of the Viet-Nameese people, who enjoy the support of all freedom-loving and honest persons. The movement of solidarity with struggling Viet-Nam is gaining strength throughout the world.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, together with other socialist States, is giving full support and aid to the heroic Viet-Nameese people in their just struggle. The Czechoslovak delegation, expressing the will of all our people, once again condemns most emphatically the intensification of aggression in Viet-Nam and declares its unqualified support for the just demand that the United States forthwith put an end to bombing and other reckless acts of aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, withdraw its armed forces and remove its military equipment from South Viet-Nam, and cease all intervention whatsoever in the internal affairs of Viet-Nam.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

I should now like to explain the position of my delegation on the question of non-proliferation. The first part of the Eighteen-Nation Committee's session this year was held with due awareness of the importance and urgency of solving this question in accordance with resolution 2028(XX) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/161). At the meeting held on 10 May, which concluded that first stage of this year's session, the representative of the Soviet Union noted:

"A further useful element in our work has been the fact that, in the course of discussion both of the problems of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of other problems, the positions of the various parties have been clarified and we have ascertained what lies at the basis of the fundamental divergencies among members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on various disarmament questions."

(ENDC/PV.263, p.29)

One can fully agree with that assessment.

It would therefore be only logical that the next step should be the reconsideration of the respective positions principally by those delegations whose proposals were subjected to concrete and just criticism in the Committee. It would then be possible to proceed to the preparation of a joint draft treaty to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly.

If we look back at the course of the discussion this spring when a comparison was made between the two proposals submitted -- the Soviet draft (ENDC/164) and the United States draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1) -- we shall see that the basic tenor of the criticisms revealed above all the shortcomings and inadequacies of the United States draft treaty. The Government of the United States had an opportunity to avail itself of the recess in order to discuss the new situation with its allies in NATO and to take a decision which would open the way to the achievement of agreement. However, in order to do so it would have had to place the common interests of all States above its own particular interests and, above the nuclear aspirations of its ally in NATO, the Federal Republic of Germany. That did not happen.

The position of the member States of NATO on this subject seems to have been correctly reflected by the comments made in the New York Herald Tribune of 13 June 1966 on the occasion of the opening of this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee:

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(continued in English)

"It was hoped that, if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization could clarify its nuclear-sharing arrangements by the summer, active negotiations might start with the Russians. Instead NATO has been so preoccupied with the confusion caused by France's decision to withdraw troops from the alliance that the nuclear-sharing policy has been shelved. According to reliable US sources, the American delegation here has therefore been instructed to shift the emphasis to other measures in the forthcoming session ...".

(continued in Russian)

We cannot escape the impression that this assessment reflects to a considerable extent the present position of the United States delegation. The United States delegation is trying to bring about the impression that by submitting a revised draft of its original proposals it has shown an adequate degree of readiness to accept a compromise solution, and that it now depends on the delegations of the socialist countries whether our negotiations lead to definite and concrete results. The representatives of the Western Powers allege that one side -- that is, the West -- has already shown the required initiative and that it is now up to the Soviet delegation to submit amendments to its own draft treaty.

However, the legitimate question arises: what amendments should the Soviet delegation make in the basic provisions of its draft, if none of the delegations in the whole course of this year's session has shown in what particulars the Soviet draft fails to satisfy the basic principles of non-proliferation as formulated in resolution 2028(XX) of the United Nations General Assembly? Is that not due to the fact that the Soviet draft treaty solves the question of preventing proliferation both comprehensively and consistently, affording no opportunity for a double interpretation and leaving no loop-holes for manoeuvring in regard to non-proliferation in favour of anyone whatsoever, whether an individual State or an alliance of States?

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

Thus the problem is not at all - as the Western delegations are now attempting to show - whether in the course of the negotiations amendments were made to individual draft treaties, but what the substance of those amendments is, and to what extent they bring us closer to the achievement of agreement on the question of non-proliferation. As for the revised draft treaty submitted by the United States in March of this year, the socialist States have already demonstrated convincingly enough that it not only failed to eliminate but, on the contrary, emphasized still more the fact that the United States approach would in fact legalize the possibility of disseminating nuclear weapons by means of military groupings.

In these circumstances all appeals to the socialist States to make concessions on the basic issue of non-proliferation are nothing but an attempt to persuade the Committee to be content with the incomplete and partial solution proposed by the Western delegations.

The socialist States are prepared to examine any proposals likely to contribute towards bringing about the conclusion of a treaty which would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by any means and in any form. To accuse the socialist States of intransigence merely because they will not agree to the unacceptable concept that is being pressed through by the Western countries is nothing but an attempt to divert the Eighteen-Nation Committee from solving in principle the problem of prohibiting further nuclear proliferation in accordance with resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly.

As for the allegation of the Western delegations that initiative has been shown this year by only one side, the United States, I think it appropriate to recall that it was precisely the Soviet Union that made a substantial addition to its initial draft: namely that contained in the message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. A.N. Kosygin (ENDC/167). That proposal for ensuring the security of the non-nuclear States in the event of the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty was favourably received by an overwhelming majority of delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The present suggestion by the Soviet delegation that that proposal should take the form of a separate article in the treaty is the best

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possible proof that the socialist States are seriously endeavouring to reach an agreement on non-proliferation in which the obligations and responsibilities of all member States would be appropriately balanced, as has been stressed above all by the delegations of the non-aligned States and is also required by General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

In this connexion, I should like once again to point out that the USSR draft treaty excludes any discrimination whatever against individual States or their alliances, and guarantees identical security for all parties to the treaty. Unfortunately that cannot be said of the United States draft treaty, which places some non-nuclear States in a more advantageous position than others, just as it places some military alliances, above all NATO, in such a position as compared to others. Of course this concept on which the United States draft treaty is based cannot be accepted.

When the socialist States rightly criticize the position of the Western Powers, they are accused of interfering in the internal affairs of military blocs. At the meeting of the Committee held on 10 May the United States representative, Mr. Foster, stated the following:

"The United States -- and I believe I can speak for its allies as well -- does not plan to seek the approval of the Soviet Union for carrying out any plans for nuclear defence which we and our allies may deem to be necessary. It is therefore not appropriate for the Soviet Union or other States outside the NATO alliance to become involved in the intricacies of the internal relations within NATO". (ENDC/PV.263, p.14)

Since such charges against the socialist States continue to be made even now, allow me to repeat the view expressed by my delegation on this problem at our meeting of 22 February:

"First, there can be no doubt that a non-proliferation treaty is not aimed at the dissolution of existing military alliances. Nor is its purpose to interfere in the activity or internal affairs of these alliances. However,

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this premise, of course, remains valid only as long as their activity does not affect the field of proliferation of nuclear weapons. As soon as any actions within the framework of military groupings led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form, they would naturally become incompatible with a treaty on measures to prevent proliferation.

"It is precisely this danger that is inherent in the plan for the integration of nuclear armament, various versions of which have for long been a subject of discussion among some of the States members of NATO".

(ENDC/PV.242, pp.31, 32)

The prohibition of nuclear proliferation through military alliances which is contained in the Soviet draft treaty would apply in equal measure to NATO, SEATO, CENTO and the Warsaw Pact, and also to all other military alliances or groupings that exist now or could arise in the future. This universality of the scope of the treaty in respect of all States and all alliances of States is one of the basic factors in ensuring a balance of obligations where the prohibition against disseminating nuclear weapons is concerned. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as a member of the Warsaw Pact, is prepared to assume fully all obligations that would derive from the signing of such a non-proliferation treaty.

In the light of all these facts there are no grounds whatever for the allegation of the Western delegations that the Soviet draft treaty represents a threat to the integrity of NATO and an attempt to bring about dissensions within the North Atlantic bloc. Do not the basic causes of the differences of opinion on the question of concluding a non-proliferation treaty lie within NATO itself? Do they not lie in the unremitting attempts of the Federal Republic of Germany to obtain access to nuclear weapons precisely through NATO? And is it not the nuclear aspirations of the Federal Republic of Germany that oblige us to pay such great attention in our negotiations to the situation in Europe and in NATO?

Thus the demand that the non-proliferation treaty should systematically preclude all possibilities of disseminating nuclear weapons is consequently, not a one-sided campaign by the socialist States against NATO, but a demand which arises from the

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

objective situation. It is therefore in the interests of all States that wish to achieve an effective non-proliferation treaty to prevent the creation of this dangerous precedent, which would have most serious consequences for peace and security throughout the world.

Notwithstanding these well-known facts, the Western Powers are making concessions to the pressure of West German militarists and are attempting to force through, in our negotiations on non-proliferation, the text of a treaty which would leave open the possibility of disseminating nuclear weapons within military alliances and, in particular, would enable the Federal Republic of Germany to obtain access to nuclear weapons through NATO.

Therefore it depends mainly on the Western allies of the Federal Republic of Germany, and in the first place on the United States, whether common sense will prevail in their approach to the solution of the question of non-proliferation and whether their position will contribute to the achievement of agreement. There are certain symptoms that indicate that the United States is more inclined to choose a course which takes us still further away from that objective.

In an article entitled "The German Question: Problem of Priority" published in The New York Times of 23 June 1966, the correspondent, Max Frankel, examining this basic contradiction in United States policy, wrote: (continued in English)

"And those who wished to push ahead on a treaty forbidding the spread of nuclear weapons and other discussions of European security have run up against the State Department's position that the needs of the West, above all the politics of West Germany, deserved priority".

(continued in Russian)

Naturally, if such views prevail, and if the Government of the United States would rather satisfy the increasing nuclear aspirations of the Federal Republic of Germany than make efforts to achieve an early agreement in the negotiations on non-proliferation, our discussions in this Committee will have little hope of success. Then we shall indeed appear before the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly empty-handed.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

Allow me to stress once again that the Czechoslovak delegation is interested in an early and positive solution of the problem of prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to make progress in the negotiations for the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, it would be appropriate at this point to ask along what lines the further work of our Committee should be organized. The Czechoslovak delegation believes that the order of business suggested at the meeting of 23 June by the representative of the USSR, Mr. Roshchin, is best suited to the present stage of our discussions:

"Let us now establish, by comparing the two draft treaties submitted by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America respectively, which of them meets the requirements for solving the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and, if necessary, let us add other clauses to the existing ones in order to provide in a concrete way for the closing of all loop-holes for access to nuclear weapons. We are convinced that the drafting of such a treaty is not at all as complicated as some people try to make us believe."

(ENDC/PV.267, p.12).

By acting in that manner we could be sure of having a constructive and businesslike discussion, and we could get a clear idea of the direction to be taken in order to carry out the task assigned us by the United Nations General Assembly at its twentieth session.

Having studied and compared the Soviet and United States draft treaties in detail, the Czechoslovak delegation continues to believe that the Soviet draft meets the requirements of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and is at present the only suitable basis for the preparation of a non-proliferation treaty.

Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): Among the collateral measures of disarmament the consideration of which is on our agenda today, the Mexican delegation has no doubt about the priority which should be given to the question of a treaty banning completely nuclear weapons tests of any nature and in all conceivable physical environments. Even if there were no outcry by mankind demanding this, there would suffice the many and repeated requests which have been made to us both by the Disarmament Commission and by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and which emphasize the consideration of this question as a matter of urgent priority.

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Very soon, on 5 August this year, three years will have elapsed since that day in 1963 when the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was signed in Moscow. That event was greeted at the time with universal jubilation because it barred atomic weapons from outer space and put an end, on this humble planet on which we live, to radioactive contamination of the air we breathe and the food we eat.

The climate of confidence and optimism which was the immediate result of the relaxation of international tension lasted for about a year. In this situation it was even possible to take two further steps. The first was the resolution of the General Assembly, adopted unanimously and by acclamation on 17 October 1963, which prohibited in its turn the launching of satellites carrying nuclear weapons and requested all States to refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit in outer space (A/RES/1884(XVIII)). The second was the unilateral but parallel decisions of the United States and the Soviet Union, announced on 20 April 1964, to take the necessary measures to reduce the production of fissile material for weapon purposes (ENDC/131, 132). This Committee, in noting "with deep satisfaction" -- that was the term used (ENDC/PV.185, p.5) -- the announced measures saw in them the beginning of a process which normally would lead to a total freezing of the production of nuclear weapons and thereby to the cessation of the arms race, or at least of the nuclear arms race.

Those high hopes very soon began to fade because not all the nuclear Powers adhered to the Moscow Treaty, as a result also of the explosion of the first Chinese atomic bomb in October 1964, and lastly as a result of the general worsening of the international situation because the cold war turned into hot wars -- local ones perhaps, but no less extensive and cruel.

It is true that the Moscow Treaty is still in force; it has been acceded to by almost all the Members of the United Nations, and, having -- so far as one can judge -- been observed by all the States parties to it, is continuing to produce the beneficial effects which we could have expected from it from the very beginning by reducing, at least slightly, the production of nuclear weapons, since only underground tests are now permitted, and by having freed mankind from the scourge of contamination of the atmosphere by radioactive fall-out. Nevertheless, the existence and duration of the treaty are now in danger as long as it does not have the adherence of all States, especially nuclear Powers, and as long as it does not

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extend its prohibitions, in accordance with the aim expressed in its preamble, to cover underground nuclear weapon tests.

We have already had occasion to speak here of the essentially dynamic character which we consider the Moscow Treaty to have. By this we mean that either it will move ahead and be broadened in its content and universality until it thus attains the final goal which those who drafted it had in mind; or, on the contrary, by remaining in a status quo which is in any case precarious, it will be liable any day to fall victim to the germs of caducity which it harbours explicitly in its article IV. In fact, this provision stipulates that -

"Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." (ENDC/100/Rev.1)

We realize how difficult it is not to insert a similar provision in a treaty of unlimited duration; and we realize also that, although nothing may have been said in this respect, the parties to the treaty would in any case have the privilege of denunciation or withdrawal by virtue of the proviso rebus sic stantibus, which is an implied resolute condition of most international treaties. Furthermore, it is quite possible, as has been pointed out repeatedly, that the Moscow Treaty has the merit of limiting the scope of that proviso to the contingencies or events specified in the article quoted above.

Nevertheless, the limitation is, quite frankly, more apparent than real, either because of the vagueness of its language, or, and above all, because the party concerned is given exclusive discretion to assign meanings to "extraordinary", "related to" or "supreme", the three decisive terms the interpretation of which in each particular case is to be the legal ground for the denunciation or withdrawal. One may wonder whether it might not have been better, instead of

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inserting these excessive and inordinate rhetorical exhortations, to limit the provision to the simple case of violation of the treaty by one of its signatories, whereupon any other party could found itself on the legally solid and well-explored exceptio non adimpleti contractus.

That is how it will have to be some day -- we imagine and hope -- when the partial Treaty of today, or the future comprehensive treaty banning nuclear tests, is accepted by all the member States of the international community, including above all the nuclear Powers. But since this condition was lacking -- and it is still lacking -- when the Moscow Treaty was signed, it was necessary in article IV to leave the doors wide open to looseness and ambiguity; because what was feared from then on was not so much the violation of the Treaty by the signatory States, all of which accept and practice peaceful co-existence, but rather the nuclear misbehaviour of States which are outside the Treaty and which, furthermore, disavow peaceful co-existence.

That is what, for the purposes of withdrawal and the disintegration of the Treaty, could turn out to be, the events covered by the terms "extraordinary" and "supreme": not the underground explosions, which are very discreet for the time being, in Nevada and Siberia, nor even perhaps the much-publicized explosions in the Sahara or the Pacific, but, on the contrary, those in the Sinkiang desert. Let us recall only how this last contingency -- and in those days it was no more than that -- was explicitly invoked immediately after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty as a typical case which could make article IV operative. All the representatives here have good memories, so there is no need to say anything more.

In short, the Moscow Treaty cries out for universal accession; and the political shrewdness which is put to work "building bridges", as Mr. McNamara would say, will never have been better employed than in pursuit of this universality. But the Treaty also requires, with more and more urgency every day, the other universality, that of its subject matter: the extension of its prohibitions to underground nuclear tests.

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It requires this in the first place because of the close link, which has so often been pointed out by the delegations of the non-aligned countries, including Mexico, between the complete prohibition of nuclear tests and the non-proliferation treaty which is now our most urgent goal. Proliferation, whether spontaneous or purposeful, would immediately be stopped by the radical elimination of any possibility for States which do not yet possess but are economically and technologically capable of producing nuclear weapons to invent or make them; by hypothesis they could not test them. Nothing demonstrates better that we were not mistaken when last year we maintained that there was a connexion between both treaties than resolution 2032 (XX), approved by the United Nations General Assembly at its last session, which states in one of the paragraphs of its preamble: "Mindful of the crucial importance of a comprehensive test ban to the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons ..." (ENDC/161) it is impossible, indeed, to give more categorical or authoritative support to our opinion regarding the interconnexion between the themes of our two-fold mandate.

In the second place, and even supposing that the number of nuclear Powers does not increase, and supposing also that there is universal acceptance by all States of the Moscow Treaty as it now stands, the mere continuation of underground nuclear tests is something which by itself imperils the peace of the world every day. At our meeting of 10 March this fact was expressed by the Swedish representative in the following way:

"Continued series of underground nuclear test explosions must be interpreted as increasing the risk of further perfectioning of the deadly weapons, undesirable per se but also because it jeopardizes the presently tenable balance of deterrence". (ENDC/PV.247, p.15)

For our part, we wonder whether deterrence or dissuasion, by continually transforming itself into super-dissuasion, might not end by nullifying itself and turning into its opposite, into "suasion" -- the term is obsolete but right --, once a Power which considered itself in danger of being irretrievably outstripped became persuaded that its security lay solely in preventive action.

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Lastly, whatever may be the contingencies resulting from this tragic play of words -- or rather, from what they imply -- mankind is anxiously wondering what is going to be the saturation point, or whether there ever will be one, of the nuclear arsenal, which is at present capable, so we are told, of annihilating three times over all and every one of the present members of the human race. It is a dreadful concept, of course, this idea of "over-killing", which was completely unknown before the nuclear age and is a strange way of ensuring -- so they say -- the peace of the world by ensuring at the outset, not once but many times over, the death of all of its inhabitants.

Whatever may be the political or technical obstacles to the conclusion of an agreement on the total cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments, we obviously cannot sanction by our approval or by our silence -- which would come to the same thing in view of the position in which we find ourselves and the duties it entails -- the endless continuation of practices which are plainly contrary to the moral conscience of mankind and to the most unequivocal resolutions of the United Nations. Indeed, in its resolution 1653 (XVI) the General Assembly declared that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons "is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity", and that any State using such weapons is "committing a crime against mankind and civilization".

That alone would have sufficed to make equally illegal all possible experiments with nuclear weapons, regardless of the environment in which they were carried out; since it is impossible to conceive how one could legally manufacture or test something the use of which is prohibited. But in many books and publications the sophism has been put forward that it is only the use and not the possession which has been condemned, because so-called nuclear strategy wants weapons of this type, not in order to use them but merely to deter a possible adversary. So to discredit this fallacy the General Assembly deemed it necessary a year later to supplement the previous

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resolution with another, resolution 1762 (XVII), which states that the Assembly itself "condemns all nuclear weapons tests". Thus there is today in morals and law -- which for us prevail over strategy -- no ambiguity at all; and in conclusion we cannot compromise with what both morals and law condemn outright, nor can we come to terms with evil.

Turning, lastly, to the technical aspect of the question, to the apparent disagreement among the nuclear Powers on whether underground nuclear explosions can or cannot at present be fully detected and identified by national seismographic stations: the Committee has available an abundance of suggestions and proposals, both individual and collective, which have been made during the last four years by the delegations of the non-aligned countries since the historic memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28) which the General Assembly, in the second of its resolutions which I have just quoted, endorsed "as a basis for the conduct of negotiations" (A/RES/1762(XVII)). I am not going to weary the Committee with a detailed account of all these proposals, because they are much too well known. I shall only say enough to show clearly once again the position of the Mexican delegation.

Our general idea is that in the treaty to be concluded or in a simple protocol to be added to the Moscow Treaty -- we raise no formal question of points of procedure -- all underground nuclear tests should be prohibited, as the United Nations resolution prescribes, and not simply those which in the present state of seismology are admitted to be detectable and identifiable. If that were agreed there would still remain the problem, as we admit, whether it would be necessary, and how and under what conditions, to proceed to the inspection or verification of certain doubtful or suspicious events.

On this we cannot express an authoritative opinion, for we are not experts in seismology; but from all that we have heard stated from various sources it does not seem either that inspections, if a very few were carried out from time to time, would seriously affect the security of the State in which they took place, or on the other hand that the doubtful explosions, also very rare and in any case of little importance, would if unverified greatly compromise the military balance.

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In these conditions, and from what has been said on various occasions by different delegations, including that of Mexico, it does not seem impossible that the parties in dispute could meet half-way, each of them accepting some risk, which would be minimal in regard either to verification or to doubt, for the sake of the supreme interest -- and here we can speak unhesitatingly of "supreme", because it is common to all mankind -- of consolidating peace by the total and final cessation of such tests.

Being anxious to help the nuclear Powers to arrive at this compromise, which is in any case necessary and cannot be deferred, the delegations of the non-aligned countries have devised various methods and procedures for observation, control and verification the common denominator of which, as was stated in the joint memorandum of 16 April 1962, is reliance on "a purely scientific and non-political basis" (ENDC/28, para.3). In this document, in fact, the possibility is indicated of establishing an international commission "consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, together with the appropriate staff ..."
(ibid., para.4). The commission thus constituted would be charged with analysing the data provided to it by the observation posts according to the co-ordination system agreed upon; and the following was added:

"All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event." (ibid.)

Lastly, and complementing that very precise obligation, there was proposed a system of consultations between the Commission and the interested party for the purpose of agreeing on the subsequent clarification measures which might be necessary and which might possibly include on-site verification.

Although the specific idea of a scientific commission has not made any progress so far, we continue to believe that the memorandum of the Eight Powers is a perfectly coherent and balanced document, since it tried to co-ordinate intelligently a number of measures directed towards the essential objective: the elucidation of the event itself. Nor did it exclude -- although it did not impose it as a Diktat -- on-site verification, which, after all, is merely one possible means among others of achieving the indicated objective: the elucidation of whatever was doubtful or uncertain.

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It was no doubt for this reason, and because at least the spirit of that document still survives among us, that the Swedish representative was able to say (ENDC/PV.256,p.4) that this is simply an "extension" of the proposals contained therein, the procedure which she herself so aptly described as "verification by challenge". Bringing into play very subtly and perspicaciously the psychological resources of self-persuasion and the sense of honour, the Swedish proposal is designed to achieve what, according to all that we have seen up to the present, is very difficult if not impossible to attain by compulsion.

For our part we look upon that proposal with great favour and, in our opinion, not the least of its merits is certainly the highly intelligent manner in which its distinguished author has linked it to the clause dealing with denunciation of the treaty. How would it be possible, in the last resort, not to agree to verification which the previous procedures showed to be absolutely necessary, when the objecting party could this time legally withdraw from the treaty? Moreover, the denunciation clause of the Swedish proposal (ibid., p.7) is in itself much better than that contained in article IV of the Moscow Treaty; since, besides introducing the new requirement of giving three months' notice to the Security Council, which will thus have time to study the situation, it bases in fact the right of withdrawal on violation of the treaty by the other party or, as we have already said, on something which no one has questioned; the exceptio non adimpleti contractus.

In the same spirit as that which inspired the memorandum of the neutral countries concerning scientific and international verification, my delegation put forward at the meeting of 8 March a suggestion (ENDC/PV.246, p.9) for the establishment of a list of possible inspectors comprising the names of the most eminent personalities in seismology and related sciences, who because of their recognized integrity would be above all suspicion. We added that the list could be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, so that the parties could if necessary have recourse to this select team and choose inspectors who offered them every guarantee of trustworthiness and competence. Clearly the proposal was simply intended to help to make possible voluntary and non-compulsory verification. Since we put forward our suggestion we have compared this list with the other list of possible judicial arbitrators which is deposited in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and constituted the Permanent Court of Arbitration, whose jurisdiction is entirely voluntary and never compulsory.

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After all, the Mexican suggestion is one of many possible variants which could very well be combined or merged with others, of the basic thought of the non-aligned countries. We have made this suggestion certainly not with the claim, which would be ridiculous at this level, of discovering anything new or portentous, but simply in order not to leave any stone unturned or any means unexplored in the search for the solution to a problem which must be solved in one way or another in the shortest possible time.

As almost a last resort, as we have already said, we could agree that for the time being the Moscow Treaty should be extended to prohibit immediately those underground nuclear experiments which because of their seismic magnitude are above the present threshold of indetermination and are therefore, beyond all question, fully detectable and identifiable by national seismographic stations. Although we are not very enthusiastic about the idea, we obviously cannot reject it, because in any case it would be a step forward and, even considering its worst aspect, would mean tolerating a lesser ill than the present one.

As we see it, the Conference could very well agree on that proposal, even if it could not agree on the moratorium proposed by the delegation of the United Arab Republic in regard to explosions below the indicated threshold (ENDC/PV.259, pp-27 et seq.) Both agreements could, in our opinion, very well be linked, but they are independent in themselves. We believe that the moratorium has no drawback in itself and has in fact been an expedient very much used in international practice. But since, on the other hand, it relies fundamentally much more than a treaty on reciprocal trust, and since trust is essentially a subjective sentiment which cannot be brought into being by arguments, we prefer to leave the development of this sentiment to the spontaneity of the conscience, and to express the hope that in this as in everything else trust, which is undoubtedly so necessary in international life, will prevail.

In conclusion, it seems to my delegation that, since there are so many intellectual elements at our disposal - scientific, legal and political -, we should do something during our present session to give the Moscow Treaty the completeness which it still lacks and to free mankind from the threat which, because of the gap in that Treaty, is still hanging oppressively over it.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): As representative of the Soviet Union, I consider it necessary to state our views. We have listened with great interest to the statements of the representatives of India, Czechoslovakia and Mexico. The Soviet delegation will study these important statements with the attention and thoroughness they deserve.

The Soviet delegation has taken the floor in order to express once again its views on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We feel obliged to speak on this question both in the interests of clarifying the situation with regard to the drafting of a non-proliferation treaty and in view of the need to achieve progress in solving this question. A correct idea of the substance of the problems before us is an essential condition for making progress. To arrive at such a correct idea is all the more important since attempts have recently been made in the Committee to depict in an obviously distorted light the reasons for the lack of success in the negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Already at the last session of the Committee the discussion revealed, it would seem, the basic difference in our respective approaches to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: namely that one draft treaty submitted to the Committee provides a complete and exhaustive solution to the problem of non-proliferation while the other creates merely the semblance of a solution, under cover of which further proliferation of nuclear weapons can take place. Obviously the problem of non-proliferation cannot be solved 10, 20 or 30 per cent. Therefore the delegation of the United States, whose draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1) is unsatisfactory, was expected to take constructive steps towards a genuine solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

However, we must say that at the meeting of the Committee on 28 June (ENDC/PV.268) nothing new was said by the United States delegation. In not a single question did the United States take a step towards solving this important problem. The basic theme of the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, was the contention that the USSR was allegedly creating additional obstacles to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation: that the USSR had recently put forward additional conditions for the solution of this problem which, allegedly, were making the negotiations on this question more difficult (ibid., pp.10,11).

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In this connexion we must emphatically reject that obviously far-fetched assertion of the United States representative. Since September the Soviet Union has introduced no additional conditions - I emphasize, no additional conditions - into its proposal on the subject of non-proliferation and the assertions on that score misrepresent the position of the USSR in an attempt to relieve the United States of responsibility for the failure of the disarmament negotiations and to shift this responsibility on to the Soviet Union.

Since Mr. Foster has stated that the USSR has recently put forward some new conditions which make the negotiations more difficult, we should like to ask him in which provisions of our draft treaty he sees those new difficulties which the USSR has allegedly placed in the way of the solution of the problem of non-proliferation. We want to know specifically. We have proposals; we have articles; we have provisions; we have definitions. Tell us which of these articles, which of these provisions, which of these definitions, have really been introduced recently and are making the solution of this problem more difficult. Then we shall be able to conduct concrete negotiations; then we shall be able to negotiate in a businesslike manner without reference to various artificial hypotheses.

In actual fact the situation is as follows. On 24 September 1965 the USSR submitted for consideration by the twentieth session of the General Assembly a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/164). That draft, without any new conditions having been introduced into it, is before the Committee for consideration. We are conducting our negotiations here on the basis of specific texts of a treaty on non-proliferation. We must examine these texts article by article, provision by provision, including individual definitions. Instead of following that path for the negotiations, which is the only possible one if there is an intention to get positive results from them, Mr. Foster has brought into these negotiations non-existent, obviously far-fetched hypotheses which are making our negotiations more difficult.

It is true that in one respect the statement of the United States representative at the last meeting contains an important admission. Mr. Foster admitted that the Soviet draft treaty resolved exhaustively the problem of the non-proliferation of

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nuclear weapons. His complaint against our draft is merely that it is too exhaustive. According to the United States representative, the Soviet draft treaty has the shortcoming that it can be interpreted - I should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the words can be interpreted - in the sense that it does not contain approval of certain forms of NATO activity in the field of nuclear weapons.

One should not try, however, to make out, as the United States delegation is trying to do, that the aim of the Soviet draft treaty is to disrupt NATO. Its only aim is to resolve the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of course, if the United States does not conceive the continuing existence of the NATO block without the proliferation of nuclear weapons within it, without the transfer of these weapons to its non-nuclear partners, in the first place to the Federal Republic of Germany, then on that basis an agreement cannot be reached. The Soviet draft treaty does not allow for such a possibility. In no other respect does the Soviet draft concern the existence of blocs. This is clear from the text of the draft treaty submitted by us to the Committee.

Instead of following the text of our draft treaty, the United States representative, in analysing the situation that would come about with the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, has engaged in diversionary manoeuvres, thus attempting to divert us from solving the problem before us. For example, he raised the question that the United States does not know what goes on in the case of the Warsaw Pact; he is interested in the question whether the Soviet Union gives any information to the participants in the Warsaw Treaty on questions concerning nuclear weapons, and so forth.

The raising of that question by the United States representative compels us, in our turn, to put certain questions. Does the United States delegation intend to report to the Eighteen-Nation Committee what is going on in the Western military blocs, what agreements exist in NATO in respect of nuclear weapons and what plans are being drawn up concerning them, particularly in the so-called "McNamara Committee"? Does the United States consider it necessary to engage in negotiations with the States represented here in regard to the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear States members of NATO?

(The Chairman, USSR)

The United States representative brought up a question which is said to be creating an obstacle in the negotiations on non-proliferation: namely, the question of consultations. In this connexion we should like to put the question in the following way: which of the provisions in our draft does not suit the United States delegation? Which of the articles of that draft would it like to change or supplement, and in what way, in view of the question of consultation raised by Mr. Foster? In regard to consultation we should like, in our turn, to ask the United States delegation the following question: to what type of consultation is it referring? Is it referring to consultations concerning the manufacture of nuclear weapons, concerning their use, or something else? Does the United States delegation consider that consultations, for example, on questions regarding the production of nuclear weapons can be allowed within the framework of a non-proliferation treaty?

The representatives of the United States and the other Western Powers are elaborating the idea that material and non-material proliferation of nuclear weapons exists. In what category do they include the disclosure of information to a non-nuclear State or a consultation with a non-nuclear State on the question of the manufacture of nuclear weapons?

In order to find a reason for criticizing our draft treaty, Mr. Foster even had to concoct the so obviously far-fetched thesis that -

"... a treaty could be proposed providing that no national of a non-nuclear-weapon State could ever come closer than 100 miles to a nuclear weapon." (ENDC/PV.268, p.12)

The United States representative needed to advance such an unfounded and obviously hypothetical proposition only because our text in fact contains no such provisions which he could subject to criticism in such a way as to convince the members of the Committee. Since such provisions were not to be found, they had to be invented.

Let us now pass on to the explanations given by the United States representative concerning our objections to the United States draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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Speaking about our objection to the definition of the concept of control in the United States draft, Mr. Foster repeated the earlier assertion that the decision to use nuclear weapons would be left in the hands of an existing nuclear State (ibid). However, the essential point of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not who will have the right to decide the question of the use of nuclear weapons, but that they should not come into the hands of other non-nuclear States. In this connexion we have asked Mr. Foster the question, and we repeat it now: does the United States draft non-proliferation treaty permit the establishment of a multilateral, Atlantic or any other NATO joint nuclear force? We are awaiting an answer to this question. So far we have not received it.

We must say, however, that we have not received an answer precisely because the United States draft contains, not only loop-holes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but huge yawning gaps through which can freely pass whole flotillas of ships equipped with nuclear weapons and belonging to a NATO multilateral nuclear force or to other joint forces of the military blocs of the Western Powers. This point, which we have already stated before, has not been refuted by the United States delegation. And this is quite understandable. The United States delegation has been unable to do so for the extremely simple reason that the United States draft treaty does provide for the possibility of setting up such a NATO nuclear force.

The United States delegation feigned surprise at our criticizing the "veto". Mr. Foster asked the rhetorical question: do we suggest that the United States should not retain its veto over the use of its own nuclear weapons? Allow me to reply to that question. In our opinion a non-proliferation treaty should not place before the United States the question whether or not the United States should keep its nuclear weapons in its own hands. The question of the right of veto derives from the fact of the transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear State. The idea of non-proliferation excludes such a transfer. If Mr. Foster insists on the "right of veto", he thereby merely confirms the United States intention to transfer United States nuclear weapons to its non-nuclear allies; that is, to disseminate these weapons in flagrant violation of the recommendations of General Assembly resolutions on this subject.

(The Chairman, USSR)

In this connexion we affirm that in a non-proliferation treaty there should be no place for a "veto" at all, because the treaty should prohibit any transfer by a nuclear Power of nuclear weapons, conditionally or unconditionally, to a non-nuclear State. We have also put the question: what would happen if a non-nuclear State, say the Federal Republic of Germany, refused to submit to the United States veto? We have not received an answer to that question either. The only thing which Mr. Foster has referred to in this regard is electronic locks, which are said to safeguard the United States veto. But not a single State can build its security on the United States veto and on the United States electromechanical locks to which the United States representatives refer.

One can, of course, assume that such locks do exist; one can even assume that they are effective today, but one certainly cannot guarantee that they will also be effective tomorrow; and, of course, it is impossible to base an important international treaty and the security of States on such locks. Therefore, whatever assurances are given us here about the reliability of the United States electromechanical locks, we declare quite categorically our objection to the solution proposed by the United States in regard to the question of the "non-proliferation" of nuclear weapons, a solution which would directly provide for the possibility of proliferating such weapons and which would offer as a guarantee the United States veto equipped with electromechanical locks.

It is also absolutely impossible to accept the argument of the Western Powers regarding the transfer of control over nuclear weapons from one State to a group of States, as expounded at the last meeting by Mr. Foster (ENDC/PV.268, p.13) and earlier by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti (ENDC/PV.267, p.16). That argument testifies to an unwillingness to go along the path of nuclear disarmament. For example, Mr. Cavalletti admitted that the prospect of the establishment of a European federation was "a remote one, perhaps very remote" (*ibid*). It is this remote and --we would stress -- hypothetical prospect that has been put forward in order to prevent the solution of an extremely urgent, real and important problem.

(The Chairman, USSR)

The Soviet Union has emphasized more than once that a non-proliferation agreement should be followed by other steps in the field of nuclear disarmament and the ensuring of the security of States. The task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee is to ensure that, in the very remote future to which Mr. Cavalletti referred, there should be no room left in the world for nuclear weapons. We must be concerned, not about living for many years under the threat of nuclear war, but about eliminating that threat. For us non-proliferation is a step in the context of other disarmament measures. For Mr. Cavalletti, apparently, this non-proliferation agreement should be achieved and then there should be a full stop. We cannot agree with that way of thinking, and we are put on our guard by the endeavour to reserve for many years ahead for alliances of States the possibility of transferring, disseminating and using nuclear weapons.

Mr. Foster has tried to give us an explanation regarding the possibility, provided for in the United States draft treaty on non-proliferation, of the transformation of a nuclear Power into an alliance of States possessing nuclear weapons. He assured us that there would not be an increase, even by one, in the number of centres able to take the decision to fire nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.268,p.13). But precisely that way of stating the question shows that a nuclear Power will be able to proliferate nuclear weapons by forming an association, hinged upon itself, with non-nuclear States, which will also obtain access to nuclear weapons.

In this question it is impossible to argue on the basis of arithmetical deductions. Behind these deductions extremely grave political problems are concealed. It is far from being a matter of indifference what political forces make up a particular "centre able to take the awesome decision to fire nuclear weapons" (ibid). In any case the Soviet delegation cannot agree that nuclear weapons could be transferred to associations or alliances of States and, for example, to such an alliance of States as that in which the Federal Republic of Germany would play the leading role. Such a way of stating the question by the representatives of the United States and Italy is aimed either at legalizing the proliferation of nuclear weapons or at making our negotiations on this subject more difficult.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Thus all the considerations and arguments advanced by Mr. Foster on 28 June show with the utmost clarity that the United States does not want to depart from its policy, which is designed to proliferate nuclear weapons. How is it possible simultaneously to follow a course directed toward the proliferation of nuclear weapons through a multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force, and to talk about wishing to reach an agreement on non-proliferation? These two directions are mutually exclusive and contradictory, just as the arms race conducted by the United States contradicts the idea of disarmament, which we are vainly trying to turn into reality. Neither references to the Pastore resolution nor references to statements by United States statesmen change the situation in regard to this question. The criterion for our evaluation of the United States position is the text of the agreement which the United States has submitted for our consideration. But this text clearly shows the lack of readiness on the part of the United States to conduct here in the Committee businesslike, concrete negotiations on a question which has been awaiting solution for so many years.

In this connexion we note that the United States is going even further in the direction of the arms race, which is closely linked with the escalation of United States aggression in Viet-Nam. We are now witnessing a new stage in the expansion by the United States of the war against the Viet-Nameese people. The densely-populated areas of Hanoi and Haiphong have been bombed, and we cannot fail to recognize that these actions by the United States are arousing universal indignation and leading to an increase in international tension. The Soviet delegation fully agrees with and adds its voice to the remarks made by the representative of Czechoslovakia concerning the aggressive actions of the United States in Viet-Nam and against the latest acts of aggression, namely the bombing of the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.

Mr. Foster reminded us at the last meeting (ibid., p.10) that almost five years had already elapsed since the General Assembly adopted a resolution on non-dissemination (A/RES/1665 (XVI)) on the initiative of Ireland but he did not say that, soon after the adoption of that resolution, the United States and the United Kingdom concluded an agreement in Nassau regarding a multilateral nuclear force, an agreement which has placed new obstacles in the way of a solution to the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(The Chairman, USSR)

Furthermore, we should like to recall that, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1961 the well-known resolution 1665 (XVI), it was prompted by a different interpretation of the term "non-proliferation" from that which Mr. Foster gave us. I shall quote the definition which Mr. Foster gave us: "So long as the effective decision to use nuclear weapons is left in the hands of an existing nuclear weapon State, there is no proliferation." (ENDC/PV.263, p.14). That definition was given by him at the meeting of 10 May and also at the last meeting of the Committee (ENDC/PV.268, p.12). Before the voting on the aforementioned resolution its author, the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, stressed that the purpose of a non-proliferation agreement was "not to give these weapons to those who do not possess them" (A/C.1/PV.1209, p.37). After that explanation the United States delegation voted in favour of the resolution, evidently agreeing that non-proliferation envisaged the non-transfer of nuclear weapons. Now, however, the United States does not regard the physical transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear State as proliferation. This shows quite clearly the change made by the United States in its concept of non-proliferation.

The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could have been successfully solved long ago if the United States had not put in the way of its solution artificial barriers and obstacles which have brought us into a dead end.

We have also not heard from the United States representative why the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, according to the United States understanding of the term, must necessarily provide for the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons to the armoury of non-nuclear States allied to the United States. In what way is the United States approach to the solution of the problem we are examining better than the approach which the General Assembly recommends to us and which prohibits any loop-holes for the direct or indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons? Does the United States concept of "non-proliferation" really move the world further away from the danger of a nuclear war? Does that concept really facilitate the achievement of a non-proliferation agreement? All our efforts to extricate this problem from the impasse

(The Chairman, USSR)

and to remove the obstacles to its solution come up against the stubborn resistance of the United States, which evidently has no liking for a solution of this problem because it does not suit the plans and designs of its main NATO partner - the Federal Republic of Germany.

All is not yet lost. We appeal again to all participants in the negotiations to apply themselves in earnest to the task entrusted to us and to make efforts to carry out the behest of the United Nations General Assembly: namely, to draft an effective treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, containing no loop-holes and no gaps.

That concludes my statement as representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): The Polish delegation would like to associate itself with the remarks of the delegations of Czechoslovakia and the USSR and to register its protest against the bombing of the Hanoi and Haiphong areas by the United States Air Force. This new act of aggression by the United States against a sovereign State, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, constitutes a flagrant violation of all accepted standards of international conduct. It has increased international tension and threatens the peace and security of all nations.

I know that we are not called upon to discuss the Viet-Nam situation here, and I do not intend to trespass beyond the limits of our mandate; but we cannot, I believe, escape the consequences of events which affect the international scene so profoundly. The new steps taken by the United States in intensifying the war against the Viet-Nameese people cannot but cast their shadow over our deliberations. The bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam cannot be considered an act of rational policy. That display of crude destructive force against a people fighting for its freedom and independence only accentuates the moral and political bankruptcy of the policy of the United States in Viet-Nam. We are convinced that it will fail, as it has failed in the past.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania)(translation from French): The delegation of the Socialist Republic of Romania wishes to express the feelings of reprobation and indignation of the Romanian people at the aggression committed by the United States of America against Viet-Nam. It emphatically condemns the bombardments carried out against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, as well as any policy of an escalation of the war, which constitutes a very grave danger to the peace of the world.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

As my delegation has emphasized repeatedly, the United States of America must put an end immediately to the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and to its aggression. The United States armed forces must be withdrawn from Viet-Nam soil, as must all foreign armed forces. The Viet-Nameese people must be free to decide their own future without foreign intervention.

The Romanian delegation considers that it must again, during this meeting, associate itself with the other socialist delegations which have taken the floor in order to protest against this new aggravation of the war waged by the United States against the people of Viet-Nam, the heavy responsibility for which rests on the United States Government.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): The United States resumed bombing in North Viet-Nam, after a thirty-seven-day pause in January and February, only to repel aggression against South Viet-Nam. The purpose of those air raids has been to restrict the ability of Hanoi to move, equip and supply its troops in South Viet-Nam. The raids upon petroleum facilities in the area of Hanoi and Haiphong were carried out because of sharply-increased use of motor transport for the infiltration of men and matériel to the South and because of a recent upsurge in the rate of this infiltration. The tonnage of supplies moved overland by Hanoi has increased 150 per cent, and personnel infiltration has increased 120 per cent compared with 1965 averages. As a result, the number of North Viet-Nameese military units in South Viet-Nam increased by more than 100 per cent in the first five months of this year. A significant aspect of that build-up has been the sharply-increased use of motor transport. Truck movement to South Viet-Nam doubled during the first five months of 1966 compared with the similar period of 1965.

As Secretary of Defense McNamara put it yesterday, "the strikes against petroleum facilities were initiated to counter a mounting reliance by North Viet-Nam on the use of trucks and powered junks to facilitate the infiltration of men and arms into South Viet-Nam." The petroleum installations were located away from the centres of Hanoi and Haiphong. Our forces were instructed to make every effort -- and I quote again from Secretary McNamara -- "to prevent harm to civilians and to avoid destruction of non-military facilities". There has been no change in our policy of refraining from attacks against civilian targets or population centres.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The escalation, to the extent to which it has occurred, has come from the other side. During the thirty-seven-day bombing pause Hanoi was obdurate in resisting any form of negotiations or any action which could lead to a lessening of hostilities on both sides. Since that time our reports from contacts from every source indicate that Hanoi is not willing to engage in unconditional discussions or to move toward peace in any other way. This obduracy left us no choice but to do what had to be done to protect our forces and those of South Viet-Nam and its other allies. At the same time we shall continue to make clear to Hanoi our desire to move the dispute from the battlefield to the conference table.

Let us remember that the fighting began in Viet-Nam with aggression from the North. We were not alone in concluding that such aggression had occurred. As early as 1962 a committee of the International Control Commission concluded that men and matériel had been sent from the North to the South with "the objective of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the armed forces and administration of the zone of the South." We are not alone in concluding that such aggression has continued. For example, in 1964 the Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States declared that the attack on South Viet-Nam was a "communist aggression... [an] organized campaign... directed, supplied and supported by the communist régime in North Viet-Nam..."

Let us remember that the armed attack from the North was escalated in intensity by Hanoi during and since the thirty-seven-day bombing pause. Let us not forget the bombing and burning by guerilla forces in the South of schools, hospitals, maternity clinics, public buses, restaurants, refugee centres and homes.

We intend to stay in Viet-Nam as long as aggression continues. The fighting there has increased in intensity as the large forces infiltrated from the North have been increasingly engaged in battle. Our response is designed to impose a greater burden on those responsible for the aggression when they direct its increase.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): In view of the late hour, I do not intend to comment today on the statements which have been made during this meeting, some of which, especially those by the representatives of India and Mexico, were particularly interesting and constructive.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Nor do I propose to speak about the remarks which have been made by certain Eastern delegations on events which are taking place far away. These delegations have once again tried to divert the attention of this Committee from measures which it is bound to work out and to negotiate. I must nevertheless point out that certain expressions used by some representatives of the East are deplorable, I will say even intolerable, at this Conference. Unless all the delegations adopt here a language in conformity with moderation and with the efforts towards peace which it is incumbent upon us to make and to which we must devote all our energy, it will be difficult for us to achieve results that are tangible and conducive to world peace. Up to now we have always been able to note that the moderate and relaxed atmosphere of our discussions represented a positive result in itself and allowed one to hope for progress at the practical level. I hope that this will continue to be so and that the Eastern delegations will not want to take upon themselves the responsibility for a change which could have negative effects upon our work.

I should like to make a very brief remark on the observations which you yourself, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of the Soviet Union, made with regard to the previous statements of my delegation. I think that, there again, there has been a certain amount of confusion. If I correctly understood your statement, you have again confused different requirements.

To begin with, the treaty we are negotiating has no date of expiry; it is, so to speak, a perpetual treaty. In negotiating it we are, I believe, bound to take into consideration all hypotheses, including the remote one of a European federation.

On the other hand, there is another requirement: namely, that non-dissemination must be associated with --- or followed by --- other limited measures of nuclear disarmament. The delegations which formulated that requirement have never alluded to the complete abolition of all nuclear weapons. The delegations that wish to associate other measures of nuclear disarmament with non-dissemination --- and, for my part, I share their point of view --- have always referred in preference to measures for "freezing", blocking and stopping the nuclear arms race --- precisely those measures which the Western delegations have often advocated here and upon which they have long insisted. Unfortunately, such measures for a freeze have not been accepted by the Soviet delegation and, unfortunately also, there is as yet no hope of its readiness

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

to accept them within the framework of a non-dissemination treaty. That is a very considerable difficulty in the way of the actual conclusion of a non-dissemination treaty, a difficulty to which we have not often referred here but which is real and could perhaps impede the favourable development that we had before us.

Lastly, reverting to the idea of a European federation -- against which you have not declared yourself, Mr. Chairman -- I should like to point out that on a number of occasions in the past my delegation has also spoken of a system of world security. That system too is a remote prospect, though greatly desired by all. We must hope that it will be possible for these two prospects -- world federation and a system of world security, which are prospects of peace for all -- to materialize in a world completely free of nuclear weapons and of violence and oppression, and for them to be realized in a harmonious manner for the good of all.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): The attitude of the Bulgarian people and its Government to the events in Viet-Nam is very well known. Our delegation has also had occasion to state that attitude during the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

For twelve years the United States has been interfering in the affairs of the Viet-Nameese people, and considers it possible to impose upon them a régime they do not want, and; moreover, to impose it by force and unprecedented brutality. Today we have been told once again that the United States is waging an ideological war, which is, however, very close to genocide. We cannot refrain from expressing, first, our indignation, secondly our protest, and thirdly our conviction that these actions by the United States have nothing to do with disarmament and impede the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

As for the remarks of certain gentlemen who consider that the Committee has assembled here in order to exchange compliments, we take such remarks to refer to themselves. Apparently it is not unjustified and wrongful actions, but the mention of them, that spoils the atmosphere in this Committee. It is necessary to mention these actions and to demand their cessation. That is the demand not of the Bulgarian delegation alone, nor of the Bulgarian people alone, nor of the peoples of the socialist countries; it is the demand of all mankind.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 269th meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A.A. Roshchin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, the United States, Italy and Bulgaria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 5 July 1966 at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

